feat: dial again to disconnected peers

[MegaRedHand]

Summary

• Add automatic redial functionality for disconnected bootnodes
• Redials occur every 30 seconds until reconnection succeeds
• Handles both clean disconnections and connection errors

Changes

• Introduced RetryMessage enum to handle both block fetch retries and peer redials
• Store bootnode addresses during initialization for later redial attempts
• Schedule redial on ConnectionClosed and OutgoingConnectionError events
• Implement handle_peer_redial() to attempt reconnection with retry logic

Test Plan

• ✅ All tests pass (make test)
• ✅ No clippy warnings (make lint)
• Manual testing: Run devnet, kill a bootnode, observe redial logs every 30s, restart bootnode to verify reconnection

[github-actions]

Kimi AI Code Review

This PR introduces a mechanism to redial disconnected bootnodes after a certain interval. Here are my review comments:

1. Code correctness and potential bugs:

   • The introduction of PEER_REDIAL_INTERVAL_SECS is good for setting the interval between redial attempts. However, it should be documented with a comment explaining its purpose.
   • In handle_peer_redial, it's good that you check if the bootnode is already reconnected before attempting to redial. This avoids unnecessary dial attempts.
   • In handle_swarm_event, when a bootnode disconnects, you schedule a redial attempt. However, you should also handle the case where the redial attempt fails, similar to how you handle fetch failures. This ensures that you keep retrying until the bootnode is reconnected.

2. Security vulnerabilities:

   • The changes in this PR do not introduce any obvious security vulnerabilities. However, it's worth noting that redialing disconnected bootnodes could potentially be exploited by an attacker to cause repeated dial attempts. To mitigate this, you could introduce some form of rate limiting or exponential backoff for redial attempts.

3. Performance implications:

   • Introducing a redial mechanism could potentially increase the number of dial attempts, which may have performance implications. However, given that this is only for bootnodes and the redial interval is relatively long (30 seconds), the impact should be minimal.

4. Rust best practices and idiomatic patterns:

   • The use of an enum RetryMessage to encapsulate the different types of retry messages is a good approach. It makes the code more readable and extensible.
   • The use of clone to obtain a sender for the retry channel is fine, but it's worth noting that this could potentially lead to multiple clones being spawned concurrently. To avoid this, you could consider using a single, shared sender that is cloned only when needed.

5. Memory safety and proper error handling:

   • The error handling in handle_peer_redial is good. You log a warning if the redial attempt fails and schedule another attempt.
   • In handle_swarm_event, when a bootnode disconnects, you schedule a redial attempt without checking if the peer is still in the bootnode_addrs map. This could potentially lead to a use-after-free if the peer is removed from the map before the redial attempt is made. To avoid this, you should check if the peer is still in the map before scheduling the redial attempt.

6. Code readability and maintainability:

   • The code is well-structured and readable. The use of comments and descriptive variable names makes it easy to understand the logic.
   • The introduction of the RetryMessage enum makes the code more maintainable, as it encapsulates the different types of retry messages in a single enum.

Overall, this is a well-written PR that introduces a useful feature for redialing disconnected bootnodes. With a few minor improvements, it should be ready to merge.

---

Automated review by Kimi (Moonshot AI)

[github-actions]

Code review by ChatGPT

[github-actions]

Code Correctness and Potential Bugs

• Line 306: When scheduling the redial, the closure capturing peer_id is not robust enough in situations of concurrent execution. Consider using a 'move' semantics to prevent any potential inconsistencies or incorrect behavior.

Security Vulnerabilities

• Ensure that bootnode redials do not introduce a denial-of-service vulnerability by indefinitely scheduling retries without adequate limits or delays, especially in a network where systemic connection issues could trigger repeated retries.

Performance Implications

• Constant retries can lead to excessive resource usage. Ensure that there is a maximum retry count or exponential backoff mechanism, especially when attempting to redial bootnodes.

Rust Best Practices and Idiomatic Patterns

• Line 300 and 314: It is more conventional to avoid nesting logic too deeply; consider refactoring logic in the handle_swarm_event function to be more linear and readable.

Memory Safety and Proper Error Handling

• Line 388: The absence of error handling in server.swarm.dial() lacks proper memory cleanup on failure scenarios, which could lead to resource leaks. Consider implementing comprehensive error handling with rollback operations.

Code Readability and Maintainability

• Lines 291-311 and 327-337: The repeated pattern of scheduling delayed tasks with tokio::spawn(async move {...}) should be extracted into a separate helper function to improve code clarity and maintainability. This would also reduce the likelihood of introducing bugs when modifications are made in the future.

Conclusion

The PR introduces functionality that could potentially enhance the p2p bootnode management but falls short in a few key areas including correctness, security, and maintainability. Address the noted concerns to make the codebase more robust and efficient.

[github-actions]

Code Review Comments

1. Code Correctness and Potential Bugs

• The change from retry_tx.send(root); to retry_tx.send(RetryMessage::BlockFetch(root)); implies a change in the type of message being sent over retry_tx. Ensure that all related components handle this new type correctly, especially where retry_tx is received and processed. Any mismatch could cause runtime errors or logic bugs. Verify the RetryMessage enum/struct and ensure it’s appropriate and thoroughly tested.

2. Security Vulnerabilities

• Message passing and async task management are crucial in consensus clients. Ensure that all message-passing channels (like retry_tx) are well-protected against untrusted inputs and that all async tasks are correctly awaited or managed to prevent dangling tasks.

3. Performance Implications

• The use of tokio::spawn inside handle_fetch_failure is a standard way to handle tasks off the main execution loop without blocking. However, excessive spawning could lead to unbounded growth in spawned tasks depending on conditions triggering retries. Consider implementing task management or limiting max retries appropriately.

4. Rust Best Practices and Idiomatic Patterns

• Consider more descriptive naming for RetryMessage::BlockFetch; if the enum type is not exclusive to block fetches, the naming should differentiate more complex operations the message may handle. This enhances self-documentation of the code.

5. Memory Safety and Proper Error Handling

• Ensure every send operation on retry_tx handles errors explicitly according to your defined logic, especially since retry_tx.send returns a result. Instead of using _ =, check the error and log it or handle it as needed. Reviewing error handling on tokio::time::sleep's await results is not necessarily required as it’s not expected to return errors unless cancelled by design.

6. Code Readability and Maintainability

• Break overly long patterns into smaller, well-documented components if they start growing in complexity. This will improve readability and maintainability in the long run.

Consensus-Layer Considerations

• The changes are part of a broader consensus mechanism (especially if dealing with retries and backoffs). Simply wrapping the root in a RetryMessage::BlockFetch suggests modular handling of retries — ensure this modularity aligns with the rest of the consensus-layer logic like Fork choice, justification, and finalization.

Overall, the updated code segment indicates progress towards better granularity in message handling but requires careful validation of its integration with existing processing mechanisms, especially the handling and receiving of retry_tx messages.

[greptile-apps]

Greptile Overview

Greptile Summary

This PR implements automatic reconnection functionality for disconnected bootnodes. The implementation stores bootnode addresses during initialization and schedules redial attempts when disconnections occur. Key changes include:

• Introduced RetryMessage enum to unify handling of block fetch retries and peer redials
• Store bootnode addresses in a HashMap<PeerId, Multiaddr> for redial lookups
• Schedule redial attempts on ConnectionClosed and OutgoingConnectionError events
• Implement handle_peer_redial() with deduplication checks and infinite retry logic
• Redials occur every 30 seconds until reconnection succeeds

The implementation follows a sensible pattern with proper state checks to avoid redundant dials when peers have already reconnected. The retry mechanism reuses the existing retry channel infrastructure, extending it from block fetches to peer management.

Confidence Score: 4/5

• Safe to merge with low risk - well-structured implementation with proper state management
• The code is well-implemented with proper deduplication checks and error handling. Tests pass and linting is clean. Minor concern about potential multiple concurrent redial tasks for the same peer if both ConnectionClosed and OutgoingConnectionError fire in quick succession, though the connected_peers check mitigates impact
• No files require special attention - changes are straightforward

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
crates/net/p2p/src/lib.rs	Added automatic redial functionality for disconnected bootnodes with retry logic and proper state tracking
crates/net/p2p/src/req_resp/handlers.rs	Updated retry message to use new RetryMessage enum for type safety

Sequence Diagram

sequenceDiagram
    participant Bootnode
    participant Swarm
    participant EventLoop
    participant RetryChannel
    participant RedialTask

    Note over Bootnode,Swarm: Normal Operation
    Swarm->>EventLoop: ConnectionEstablished
    EventLoop->>EventLoop: Insert peer to connected_peers

    Note over Bootnode,Swarm: Disconnection Occurs
    Bootnode--xSwarm: Connection Lost
    Swarm->>EventLoop: ConnectionClosed
    EventLoop->>EventLoop: Remove peer from connected_peers
    EventLoop->>EventLoop: Check if bootnode
    EventLoop->>RedialTask: Spawn task with 30s delay
    RedialTask-->>RetryChannel: Send PeerRedial message

    Note over EventLoop,RetryChannel: Redial Attempt
    RetryChannel->>EventLoop: Receive PeerRedial message
    EventLoop->>EventLoop: Call handle_peer_redial
    EventLoop->>EventLoop: Check if reconnected
    alt Already Reconnected
        EventLoop->>EventLoop: Skip redial
    else Still Disconnected
        EventLoop->>Swarm: Dial bootnode address
        alt Dial Success
            Swarm->>EventLoop: ConnectionEstablished
        else Dial Fails
            EventLoop->>RedialTask: Schedule another retry
            RedialTask-->>RetryChannel: Send PeerRedial after 30s
        end
    end

    Note over Swarm,EventLoop: Connection Error Path
    Swarm->>EventLoop: OutgoingConnectionError
    EventLoop->>EventLoop: Check if bootnode and not connected
    EventLoop->>RedialTask: Spawn retry task
    RedialTask-->>RetryChannel: Send PeerRedial after 30s

Loading

[github-actions]

Kimi AI Code Review

This PR introduces a feature to redial disconnected bootnodes after a specified interval. Here are my review comments:

1. Code correctness and potential bugs:

   • The new RetryMessage enum and bootnode_addrs HashMap are correctly added to the P2PServer struct.
   • The PEER_REDIAL_INTERVAL_SECS constant is defined and used correctly.
   • The new handle_peer_redial function is correctly implemented to redial bootnodes after the specified interval.
   • The handle_swarm_event function is updated to schedule redialing for bootnodes when they disconnect or fail to connect.
   • The handle_fetch_failure function is updated to send RetryMessage::BlockFetch instead of just the root hash.

2. Security vulnerabilities:

   • No security vulnerabilities are introduced in this PR.

3. Performance implications:

   • The new redialing feature may slightly increase the number of outgoing connections, but it should not have a significant impact on performance.

4. Rust best practices and idiomatic patterns:

   • The code follows Rust best practices and idiomatic patterns.
   • The RetryMessage enum is a good way to encapsulate the different types of retries.
   • The use of HashMap for bootnode_addrs is appropriate.

5. Memory safety and proper error handling:

   • The code is memory safe and properly handles errors.
   • The handle_peer_redial function checks if the bootnode is already reconnected before redialing.
   • The handle_swarm_event function correctly handles the case where the bootnode address is not found.

6. Code readability and maintainability:

   • The code is well-structured and easy to understand.
   • The new functions and structs are clearly documented with comments.
   • The code is maintainable and follows a consistent style.

Overall, this PR looks good and introduces a useful feature to redial disconnected bootnodes. I approve the PR with a few minor suggestions:

• In handle_peer_redial, consider adding a limit to the number of redial attempts to avoid infinite redialing in case of a persistent issue with the bootnode.
• In handle_swarm_event, consider logging a warning when the bootnode address is not found, to make it easier to diagnose issues.

Here are the suggested changes:

// In handle_peer_redial
if server.bootnode_addrs.get(&peer_id).is_none() {
    warn!(%peer_id, "Bootnode address not found, skipping redial");
    return;
}

// In handle_swarm_event
if let Some(pid) = peer_id
    && server.bootnode_addrs.contains_key(&pid)
    && !server.connected_peers.contains(&pid)
{
    let retry_tx = server.retry_tx.clone();
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(PEER_REDIAL_INTERVAL_SECS)).await;
        let _ = retry_tx.send(RetryMessage::PeerRedial(pid));
    });
    info!(%pid, "Scheduled bootnode redial after connection error");
} else {
    warn!(%peer_id, "Bootnode address not found, skipping redial");
}

---

Automated review by Kimi (Moonshot AI)

[github-actions]

Code review by ChatGPT

[github-actions]

Code Correctness and Potential Bugs

• Lines 2-7: The comment confirms that the dial operation is non-blocking and that a failed attempt will trigger an OutgoingConnectionError. Ensure that the OutgoingConnectionError event is properly handled downstream to prevent any missed reconnection attempts. Without this, peers might stay disconnected longer than desirable.

Security Vulnerabilities

• General Note: Ensuring that peer reconnections are secure is crucial. Potential points of concern include man-in-the-middle attacks during the redial process. Ensure that TLS or another encryption layer is implemented during reconnection.

Performance Implications

• Non-blocking operations, as mentioned, are essential for maintaining responsive applications. Ensure that if the task is being retried, it incorporates exponential backoff to avoid overwhelming network resources in case of persistent failures.

Rust Best Practices and Idiomatic Patterns

• Error Handling: The use of if let Err(e) = is idiomatic for handling possible errors. Make sure that the warn! logging is not suppressed or truncated in production, as this error information might be crucial for debugging.

Memory Safety and Proper Error Handling

• Error Logging: Use of warn! is good for logging non-fatal errors. Consider augmenting with telemetry if available, to provide access to historical patterns of errors.

Code Readability and Maintainability

• Documentation: The inline comment explaining the non-blocking nature of the dial attempt enhances readability and understanding of the asynchronous functionality. Consider expanding this with a reference to relevant documentation or other parts of the codebase where OutgoingConnectionError is properly handled.

Consensus Layer Considerations

• General Note: This snippet pertains to network connections, rather than consensus-specific logic directly. Ensure elsewhere in the codebase that proper integrity checks are imposed on messages being exchanged at these peer connections to safeguard consensus security.

Overall, the change in this code snippet looks reasonable with respect to the networking operation being performed. However, as network operations can be integral to consensus operation stability, ensuring robustness and security remains critical. Address the handling of OutgoingConnectionError and incorporate secure communication practices if not already present in your codebase.

[github-actions]

Kimi AI Code Review

This PR introduces a new feature to redial disconnected bootnodes after a specified interval. Here are my detailed comments and suggestions:

Code Correctness and Potential Bugs

1. Missing schedule_peer_redial function definition: The schedule_peer_redial function is called in handle_swarm_event but not defined in the provided diff. You should include the definition of this function in the PR.

2. Redialing logic in handle_peer_redial: In handle_peer_redial, you check if the peer is already connected before attempting to redial. However, you should also consider the case where the peer might have been removed from bootnode_addrs if it was successfully reconnected earlier. To handle this, you can add a check to see if the peer is still in bootnode_addrs before attempting to redial.

3. Error handling in handle_peer_redial: If server.swarm.dial(addr.clone()) fails, you log a warning and schedule another redial attempt. However, you should also consider the possibility of an infinite loop of redial attempts if the peer is consistently failing to connect. You might want to introduce a limit on the number of redial attempts or exponential backoff to avoid overwhelming the network.

Security Vulnerabilities

1. Unbounded channel usage: The use of an unbounded channel (mpsc::unbounded_channel()) for retry messages can lead to potential memory exhaustion if the sender is producing messages faster than the receiver can process them. Consider using a bounded channel with a reasonable capacity to prevent memory overflow.

Performance Implications

1. Redial interval: The redial interval is set to 12 seconds (PEER_REDIAL_INTERVAL_SECS). This might be too frequent, especially if many peers are disconnected simultaneously. Consider increasing the interval to reduce the load on the network and the server.

Rust Best Practices and Idiomatic Patterns

1. Error handling: In handle_peer_redial, you use if let Err(e) = server.swarm.dial(addr.clone()) to handle errors. It's more idiomatic to use match for error handling in Rust, as it allows you to handle different error cases explicitly.

Memory Safety and Proper Error Handling

1. Unwrap usage: In start_p2p, you use unwrap() when dialing bootnodes. This can panic if the dial operation fails. Consider using proper error handling instead of unwrapping to avoid potential panics.

Code Readability and Maintainability

1. Documentation: The new RetryMessage enum and related functions lack documentation. Adding documentation would improve the readability and maintainability of the code.

2. Code organization: The new code related to peer redialing is scattered across multiple functions. Consider organizing it into a separate module or file to improve code readability and maintainability.

Overall, the PR introduces a useful feature to improve the resilience of the P2P network. However, there are some areas that need improvement to ensure correctness, security, and performance. I hope you find these suggestions helpful!

---

Automated review by Kimi (Moonshot AI)

[github-actions]

LGTM 👍

[github-actions]

Kimi AI Code Review

### Code Review

PR Title: feat: dial again to disconnected peers

This PR introduces a feature to redial disconnected bootnode peers after a specified interval. The changes are mostly contained within the p2p crate and involve modifying the P2PServer struct, event loop, and request-response handlers.

Code Correctness and Potential Bugs

1. Missing schedule_peer_redial function definition: The schedule_peer_redial function is called in handle_swarm_event but is not defined in the provided diff. This function should be defined in the same module as handle_peer_redial.

   Suggested Change:

   pub(crate) fn schedule_peer_redial(retry_tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender<RetryMessage>, peer_id: PeerId) {
       tokio::spawn(async move {
           tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(PEER_REDIAL_INTERVAL_SECS)).await;
           let _ = retry_tx.send(RetryMessage::PeerRedial(peer_id));
       });
   }

2. Potential race condition in handle_peer_redial: The check if server.connected_peers.contains(&peer_id) might not be accurate if the peer reconnects between the check and the dial call. Consider using a more atomic approach to handle this.

   Suggested Change:

   async fn handle_peer_redial(server: &mut P2PServer, peer_id: PeerId) {
       if server.connected_peers.contains(&peer_id) {
           trace!(%peer_id, "Bootnode reconnected during redial delay, skipping");
           return;
       }
   
       if let Some(addr) = server.bootnode_addrs.get(&peer_id) {
           info!(%peer_id, "Redialing disconnected bootnode");
           match server.swarm.dial(addr.clone()) {
               Ok(_) => info!(%peer_id, "Redial successful"),
               Err(e) => {
                   warn!(%peer_id, %e, "Failed to redial bootnode, will retry");
                   schedule_peer_redial(server.retry_tx.clone(), peer_id);
               }
           }
       }
   }

Security Vulnerabilities

1. Unbounded channel usage: The use of an unbounded channel (mpsc::unbounded_channel()) for retries can lead to potential memory exhaustion if not handled carefully. Ensure that the system can handle a large number of pending retries without running out of memory.

Performance Implications

1. Redialing strategy: The redialing strategy should be optimized to avoid excessive network traffic and potential DoS attacks. Consider implementing exponential backoff or jitter to reduce the load.

Rust Best Practices and Idiomatic Patterns

1. Error handling: The unwrap() in swarm.dial(addr).unwrap(); should be replaced with proper error handling to avoid panics in case of network issues.

   Suggested Change:

   if let Err(e) = swarm.dial(addr.clone()) {
       warn!(%peer_id, %e, "Failed to dial bootnode");
   }

2. Logging: The use of info! and warn! macros is good for logging, but consider adding more context to the log messages for better debugging.

Memory Safety and Proper Error Handling

1. Proper error handling: As mentioned earlier, replace unwrap() with proper error handling to avoid panics.

Code Readability and Maintainability

1. Documentation: Adding comments explaining the purpose of new variables and functions would improve code readability and maintainability.

2. Modularization: Consider breaking down large functions into smaller, more manageable pieces to improve maintainability.

Overall, the PR introduces a useful feature for maintaining connectivity with bootnodes. However, it requires some improvements in error handling, security considerations, and code organization to ensure robustness and maintainability.

---

Automated review by Kimi (Moonshot AI)

[github-actions]

Kimi AI Code Review

This PR introduces a feature to periodically redial disconnected bootnodes, which is a critical component for maintaining network connectivity in a P2P network. Here are my detailed comments and suggestions:

Code Correctness and Potential Bugs

1. Bootnode Redial Scheduling: The function schedule_peer_redial correctly schedules a redial attempt after a specified interval. However, it does not handle the case where the peer might reconnect before the interval elapses. It would be good to add a check to cancel the scheduled redial if the peer reconnects.

   // Schedules a peer redial after the configured delay interval.
   pub(crate) fn schedule_peer_redial(retry_tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender<RetryMessage>, peer_id: PeerId) {
       tokio::spawn(async move {
           tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(PEER_REDIAL_INTERVAL_SECS)).await;
           let _ = retry_tx.send(RetryMessage::PeerRedial(peer_id));
       });
   }

   Suggestion: Introduce a mechanism to cancel the scheduled redial if the peer reconnects.

2. Redial Attempt: The handle_peer_redial function attempts to redial a disconnected bootnode. However, it does not handle the case where the redial attempt fails. It would be beneficial to implement exponential backoff for redial attempts to avoid overwhelming the network.

   async fn handle_peer_redial(server: &mut P2PServer, peer_id: PeerId) {
       // Skip if already reconnected
       if server.connected_peers.contains(&peer_id) {
           trace!(%peer_id, "Bootnode reconnected during redial delay, skipping");
           return;
       }
   
       if let Some(addr) = server.bootnode_addrs.get(&peer_id) {
           info!(%peer_id, "Redialing disconnected bootnode");
           // NOTE: this dial does some checks and adds a pending outbound connection attempt.
           // It does NOT block. If the dial fails, we'll later get an OutgoingConnectionError event.
           if let Err(e) = server.swarm.dial(addr.clone()) {
               warn!(%peer_id, %e, "Failed to redial bootnode, will retry");
               // Schedule another redial attempt
               schedule_peer_redial(server.retry_tx.clone(), peer_id);
           }
       }
   }

   Suggestion: Implement exponential backoff for redial attempts.

Security Vulnerabilities

1. Unbounded Channels: The use of unbounded channels (mpsc::unbounded_channel()) can lead to potential memory exhaustion if not handled carefully. It would be good to monitor the channel's length and take appropriate actions if it grows too large.

   let (retry_tx, retry_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();

   Suggestion: Consider using a bounded channel with a maximum capacity to prevent memory exhaustion.

Performance Implications

1. Exponential Backoff: As mentioned earlier, implementing exponential backoff for redial attempts can help prevent overwhelming the network and improve performance.

Rust Best Practices and Idiomatic Patterns

1. Error Handling: The code uses unwrap() and ignores errors in some cases, which can lead to panics. It would be better to handle errors gracefully.

   swarm.dial(addr).unwrap();

   Suggestion: Handle errors gracefully instead of using unwrap().

Memory Safety and Proper Error Handling

1. Proper Error Handling: As mentioned earlier, using unwrap() can lead to panics. It would be better to handle errors properly.

Code Readability and Maintainability

1. Documentation: The code lacks documentation, which can make it difficult for other developers to understand the code's purpose and functionality.

   Suggestion: Add documentation comments explaining the purpose and behavior of each function.

Overall, the PR introduces a valuable feature for maintaining network connectivity. However, there are some areas that need improvement, particularly in error handling and security. With the suggested changes, the code would be more robust, secure, and maintainable.

---

Automated review by Kimi (Moonshot AI)

[github-actions]

Code review by ChatGPT

[github-actions]

General Comments

The code snippet provided is limited, focusing primarily on peer disconnection handling in a P2P context. The changes suggest minor formatting adjustments, with no direct functional impact visible in this snippet.

Code Correctness and Bugs

• No direct issues: The changes from this snippet don't introduce functional errors or bugs.

Security

• Security checks missing: While not shown here, ensure that peer disconnection logic elsewhere in your code handles unexpected cases securely, such as preventing disallowed state transitions or peer impersonation.

Performance

• Negligible performance impact: Formatting changes will not affect performance.

Rust Best Practices

• Idiomatic Spacing: The removal of trailing whitespace aligns with Rust's style conventions, promoting clean, readable code.

Memory Safety and Error Handling

• Error Handling: Ensure robust error handling when dealing with potentially unreliable network connections, though this snippet alone provides no context for such evaluation.

Code Readability and Maintainability

• Code Clarity: The logging statement continuation (info!) suggests appropriate logging but should encapsulate relevant context detailing why disconnections occur, if not already present in your logging elsewhere.

Consensus-Layer Considerations

This snippet does not reveal specific consensus-layer logic, impairing the ability to critique areas like fork choice or state transition functions directly. However, ensure across the codebase that:

• Fork Choice: Logic strictly follows LMD GHOST or 3SF-mini rules.
• Attestation/Justification/Finalization: Ensure they adhere to Ethereum's expected protocols.

Conclusion

While this snippet looks good in terms of style and doesn't break functionality, please review the codebase for the points mentioned above, especially from security and consensus-layer perspectives. Given the limited scope presented, the full PR review context is necessary.

Final Note

If the changes are isolated to formatting or minor style adjustments without functionality alteration, consider this review as active acceptance contingent upon ensuring broader systemic checks across the lines of code implicated in the PR.